1501 Neil Avenue, Room 120
Columbus, Ohio 43201
Robert S. Ross is professor of political science at Boston College, associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University, and senior advisor of the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University in 1984. Since 2009 he has been adjunct professor at the Institute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College. He has taught at Columbia University and University of Washington.
In 1989 Ross was a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C.
In 1994-95 he was Fulbright professor at the Chinese Foreign Affairs College, in 2003 he was a visiting senior fellow at the Institute of International Strategic Studies, Qinghua University, Beijing, and in 2014 was visiting scholar, School of International Relations, Peking University. In 2009 he was visiting scholar, Institute for Strategy, Royal Danish Defence College.
Ross's research focuses on Chinese security policy, East Asian security, and U.S.-China relations. His recent publications include Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power, and Politics; China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, and New Directions in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy. His other major works include Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History; Great Wall and Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security; Negotiating Cooperation: U.S.-China Relations, 1969-1989; and The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979. Ross is the author of numerous articles in World Politics, The China Quarterly, International Security, Security Studies, Orbis, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, and Asian Survey. His books and articles have been translated in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and various European countries.
Ross has been the recipient of research fellowships from University of Washington and Columbia University. He has received research and collaborative project grants from the Social Science Research Council, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, Smith-Richardson Foundation, International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), Asia Foundation, and United States Institute of Peace.
Ross has testified before various Senate and House committees and the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, he advises U.S. government agencies, and he serves on the Academic Advisory Group, U.S.-China Working Group, United States Congress. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and National Committee for U.S.-China Relations. Ross is also a member of the executive committee of the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University. He is a founding member and former board member of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (USCSCAP) and former co-chair of the committee's task force on Confidence Strategic Building Measures. He is on the editorial board of Security Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Cold War Studies, Issues and Studies, Asia Policy, Journal of Chinese Political Science, and Chinese Political Science Review.
Abstract
In 2013 the United States and China had restored regional stability and great power cooperation because each power adjusted its policies in response to the other’s coercive policy toward their respective allies. Third-party coercive diplomacy was the critical element in both the heightened regional instability from 2010-2012 and in the restoration of U.S.-Chinese cooperation in 2013. U.S. policy toward North Korea had challenged Chinese security in Northeast Asia and heightened the risk of war on China’s northeast border, causing China to re-think the merits of its support for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
The Sino-Japanese territorial dispute challenged U.S. interests in regional stability and risked U.S. involvement in hostilities with Japan against China over materially insignificant islands, causing the United States to re-think its support for Japanese policy. Nonetheless, since 2013 ongoing great power competition and alliance politics contributed to heightened pressure for each great to expand its alliance commitments, undermining the prospects for mutual restraint.
